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The Application of Emergency

Exemptions Under CEQA: Loopholes in
Need of Amendment?
Occasionally it becomes necessary to waive certain environmental
regulations in an emergency situation. Such regulations, however,
were not meant to be waived when serious environmental and
economic destruction might occur. I do not believe that current
efforts to stop the white bass from entering the Delta and destroy-

ing our fisheries are sufficient. I hope I'm proven wrong.'

The overriding goal of the California Environmental Quality Act
(CEQA)2 is to create and maintain conditions under which man and
nature can exist in productive harmony. 3 In enacting CEQA, the

California Legislature declared a policy of the state to be the development of a high-quality environment that fulfills the social and economic
requirements of present and future generations. 4 To accomplish this
laudable undertaking, CEQA requires that ". . . all agencies of the
state government which regulate activities . . . which are found to

affect the quality of the environment, shall regulate such activities
so that major consideration is given to preventing environmental

damage, while providing a decent home and satisfying living environment for every Californian." 5 When projects or activities are evaluated
to determine the effect on the environment, CEQA requires that both
long-term and short-term benefits and costs be considered. 6 In certain instances, these requirements prove to be of great importance

to the protection of the environment while inordinately vexatious in
application.

1. Assemblyman Phillip Isenberg, Pumping Tulare Lake Water To The Delta, A Tragedy
In The Making, (Oct. 26, 1983) (copy on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
2. California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. Put. Rs. CODE §§21000-21176 [hereinafter
referred to as CEQA]. CEQA was modeled after the federal environmental protection plan,
the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4370 [hereinafter referred to as NEPA].
The impetus for CEQA was provided by a 1970 report, prepared by the California Assembly
General Research Committee. Report of Assembly Select Committee On Environmental Quality, Environmental Bill of Rights (1970). The report stated that the purpose of the proposed
CEQA would be to require all state and local agencies to consider the impact of their activities
on the environment. Id. at 7. CEQA was signed into law on September 18, 1970.
3. CAL. PuB. Ras. CODE §21001(e).
4. Id. §21001(a), (e).
5. Id. §21000(g) (emphasis added).
6. Id. §21001(g).
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The provisions of CEQA, the State CEQA Guidelines,7 and judicial
decisions demonstrate that CEQA, in large measure, is designed to
serve an informational function. 8 CEQA satisfies this information
gathering function primarily through the "environmental impact
report" (EIR).9 The purpose of an EIR is to provide public agencies
and the public in general with detailed information about the effect
that a proposed project is likely to have on the environment.'" Additionally, the EIR is used to list ways in which significant environmental
effects of a project might be minimized and to indicate alternatives
to the project."
Whenever a proposed project may significantly affect the environment, CEQA requires the production of an EIR.' 2 The apparent rationale behind the EIR process is that public agencies will make
reasonable, environmentally sound decisions on projects as long as
they possess and consider all relevant environmental information.13
The effectiveness of CEQA, therefore, largely depends on the quality
4
and the quantity of information that is provided to public agencies.1
The general rule requiring the production of an EIR for all proposed projects that may significantly affect the environment, however,
is subject to numerous exceptions. These exceptions, or exemptions
from the EIR requirement of CEQA, have been the subject of much
controversy and litigation. For the most part, courts are reluctant to
imply or otherwise arbitrarily broaden an exemption, absent clear
legislative intent. 5 California appellate courts have not interpreted the
specific class of CEQA exemptions pertaining to various emergency
situations. This author will propose that the judicial reluctance to imply
or broaden exemptions, should apply similarly to the emergency
exemptions.

7. Guidelines For Implementation of the California Environmental Quality Act of 1970,
CAL. ADmiN. CODE tit. 14, §§15000-15387 [hereinafter referred to as State CEQA Guidelines].
8. See generally id; CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §§21000-21176 (numerous sections throughout
CEQA pertain to informational aspects).
9. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §§21002.1 (use of environmental impact report) 21061 (defini-

tion of environmental impact report).
10. Id. §21061.
11. Id.
12. Id. §21100.
13. See Comment, Environmental DecisionMaking Under CEQA: A Quest For Uniformity,
24 U.C.L.A. L. Rv. 838, 847 (1977).
14. Id.
15. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§21080-21080.13, 21102, 21150, 21169-21172 (statutory ex-

emptions); CAL. ADxmlN.

CODE tit.

14, §§15300-15329 (categorical exemptions); Note: The En-

vironmental Impact Statement Requirement In Agency Enforcement Adjudication, 91 HARv.

L. REv. 815, 825 (1977-78); see infra notes 69-99 and accompanying text.

1090

1984 / CEQA Emergency Exemptions

In support of this proposition, this comment will focus on pertinent policy and procedural provisions of CEQA. Specifically, the
following analysis will determine whether the emergency exemptions 6
found in CEQA can be, and in fact have been, used as a means of
circumventing the EIR review process. This author suggests that, in
many instances, use of the emergency exemptions may be consistent
with the letter of the environmental regulations, though quite inconsistent with the spirit of CEQA."7
To illustrate this point, an examination of what constitutes an
emergency under CEQA will be made, with consideration given to
the role of economic factors in the environmental review process. As
a model for discussing the broad, problematic balancing goals of
CEQA, and application of the emergency exemption provisions, a recent project known as the Tulare Lake Emergency Pumping Project
or "dewatering" project will be considered. 8 This project, involving
substantial environmental and economic interests, clearly demonstrates
the difficulties encountered by administrators of public agencies when
they are required to make decisions under CEQA. For example,
deciding whether an exemption properly applies to the facts of a given
project may entail sophisticated statutory construction and intricate
balancing of values.
This comment will provide a brief overview of CEQA, primarily
in terms of policy orientation and procedural mechanics. 9 The importance of the EIR will be discussed, as will the various provisions
exempting projects from the EIR review process.20 After analyzing
the emergency exemption provisions found in CEQA, the author will
examine the background of the Tulare Lake Pumping Project and
consider the local environment and economy of the Tulare Lake
Basin.2 As with any project evaluation under CEQA, this information is critical to enable the decision-maker to perform his duties
properly.
In analyzing whether the emergency exemptions of CEQA could
be or have been used to circumvent the EIR requirement, general principles of statutory construction, judicial interpretations of pertinent
CEQA provisions, and legislative intent will be considered. While this
author concedes that legitimate emergencies do merit a specific type
16.

CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §§21080(b)(2), (3), (4), 21172.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See
See
See
See
See

infra
infra
infra
infra
infra

notes
notes
notes
notes
notes

136-48 and accompanying text.
235-82 and accompanying text.
161-232 and accompanying text.
22-68 and accompanying text.
169-226 and accompanying text.
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of administrative treatment, this comment will suggest that, in reality,
various degrees of emergencies warrant different treatment. Each
emergency situation likely will present the administrator with a differing set of facts and time constraints within which to determine
the applicability of CEQA.
Has an "emergency" situation or a gubernatorial "declaration of
emergency" become a talisman in whose presence CEQA fades away?
Is CEQA the paper tiger it was initially characterized as, or a truly
substantive act to be interpreted to afford the fullest possible protection to the environment? In answering these difficult, interpretational
questions through the use of the Tulare Lake Model, this author will
conclude that the emergency exemptions in fact have been abused in
a manner inconsistent with the protectionist philosophy of CEQA.
Since the policy and procedural provisions of CEQA are crucial to
an understanding of the emergency exemptions, this comment
preliminarily will evaluate these significant aspects of CEQA.
THE CALiFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACT

(CEQA)

As enacted in 1970, CEQA was characterized in various ways: as
rather simple and uncomplicated, a paper tiger, paper pollution, even
an Act in a period of gestation. 22 One commentator has gone so far
as to claim that CEQA virtually was ignored in its infancy.23 With
the seminal case of Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors,24
however, the California Supreme Court in 1972 declared the importance of CEQA as a procedural and substantive means of providing
environmental protection.25 In an era of commercial and industrial
expansion in which the environment has been violated repeatedly by
those who are oblivious to the ecological well-being of society, the
significance of CEQA cannot be understated. 26 The court enormously
expanded the potential of CEQA to affect governmental decisionmaking at all levels by holding that CEQA applies to any private
and public activity for which a permit or similar entitlement is
required.27 Most importantly, Friends of Mammoth stands for the
proposition that CEQA is to be interpreted to afford the fullest possible

22.

Hagman, Foreword to Symposium: EnvironmentalLaw, 19

SANTA

CLARA L. REv. 513,

515-16 (1979).
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
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Coment, supra note 13, at 841.
8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972).
Id. at 252, 502 P.2d at 1051-52, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 763-64.
Id. at 255, 502 P.2d at 1053, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 765.
Id. at 259, 502 P.2d at 1056, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 768; see Comment, supra note 13, at 842.

1984 / CEQA Emergency Exemptions

protection to the environment within the reasonable scope of the
statutory language. 28
As noted above, tremendous difficulties are encountered by administrative decision-makers seeking to balance significant environmental and economic considerations within the context of a project evaluation. Although the claim has been made that the primary purpose
of CEQA merely is to provide an environmental full-disclosure document through the EIR, 29 a more persuasive argument can be made
that CEQA represents a truly significant shift in the prioritization
of values as they relate to the effects of projects on the environment.30
One of the most important legislative policy statements in CEQA
evidences the intent that "the long-term protection of the environments . . . shall be the guiding criterion in public decisions. ' ' 31 As
a result, to the extent that agencies gave higher priority to the encouragement of economic growth than to consideration of environmental factors in the pre-CEQA era, CEQA has been instrumental in
reordering the respective weight given to economic and environmental factors.32 Project decisions under the CEQA framework must be
made in a manner that gives higher priority to environmental considerations. 33 Thus, placing economic factors above, or even on an equal
footing with environmental factors, should be viewed as a failure to
comply with the spirit of the legislative intent. 34 Recent amendments
to CEQA, however, may have injected a more significant economic
component into the environmental review process.3 5 For example, the
Legislature has expressed as a policy of CEQA the goal of providing
a decent home and satisfying living environment for every

28. 8 Cal. 3d 247, 259, 502 P.2d 1049, 1056, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761, 768 (1972).
29. See Comment, The Compatibility Of Economic And Environmental Objectives In
Governmental Decision Making, 5 PAC. L. J. 92, 97 (1974).

30. Id. at 99. Since CEQA was patterned after NEPA, federal court interpretation of NEPA
is highly persuasive precedent for California court interpretations of CEQA. See Friends of
Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 260, 502 P.2d 1049, 1057, 104 Cal. Rptr.
761, 769 (1972). The federal court in Sierra Club v. FroehIke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex.
1973) stated:

What must not be overlooked is the priority assigned by Congress to environmental
factors under NEPA. As this court understands this body of law, protection of the
environment is now viewed as paramount, and it is not to be placed on an equal

footing with the usual economic and technical factors.
Id. at 1370.
31. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §2100(d) (emphasis added).
32. See Comment, supra note 29, at 93.
33. See CAL. PuB. Ris. CODE §§21000, 21001.
34. See Comment, supra note 29, at 98-99.
35. See, e.g., CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §§21000(g), 21001(d), 21080 (providing further CEQA

exemptions).
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Californian.3 6 Nevertheless, as a general rule, the law does require
that environmental factors be given clear priority in environmental
decision-making.17
An additional legislative intent section of CEQA will be of importance to the analysis of the Tulare Lake Emergency Pumping Project. This section provides that the policy of the state is to prevent
the elimination of fish or wildlife species due to man's activities.3
Furthermore, the intent of the Legislature is to ensure that fish and
wildlife populations do not drop below self-perpetuating levels. 39
Representations of all plant and animal communities and examples
of the major periods of California history are to be preserved for
future generations.40

The Tulare Lake Emergency Pumping Project posed a serious threat
to the fisheries resources of the state. 4 ' The CEQA policy of preventing the elimination of fish or wildlife, therefore, is directly applicable
to the facts of the Tulare Project and should have been given due
consideration in the decisional process therein. In light of the decision to approve the pumping project, however, far too little consideration was accorded that state policy. Due to the insufficient deference
to state policies on the part of agency decision-makers, the proposition that exemptions should be construed narrowly becomes substantially more important. This comment will show that current misuse
of the emergency exemptions of CEQA likely will continue unless appropriate measures are implemented to restrict similar abuse. Before
delving into these questions, an overview of the procedural mechanics
of CEQA and a discussion of the backbone of CEQA, the EIR, will
follow.
The CEQA ProceduralRoad Map: A Three Step Process

A.

In a simplified manner, the environmental review process under
CEQA can be explained in several phases.4 2 The first determination
to be made by a public agency is whether the project is subject to
CEQA at all.4 3 If the project is covered by a specific statutory or
categorical exemption provision, then the process does not need to
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

42.
43.
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Id. §§21000(g), 21001(d).
Id. §21001(d).
Id. §21001(c).
Id.
Id.
See infra notes 227-32 and accompanying text.
CAL. ADmIN. CODE, tit. 14, §15002(k).
Id. §15002(k)(1).
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proceed any further." The agency may then prepare a notice of
exemption. 5 If, on the other hand, no specific exemption applies to
the proposed project, the provisions of CEQA are applicable. An
agency designated as the "lead agency"" then must take the second
step and conduct an initial study to determine whether the project
may have a significant effect on the environment. 7 If the initial study
shows that no substantial evidence exists to support a finding that
the project may have a significant effect on the environment, the lead
agency prepares a negative declaration. 4 This second step of the CEQA
process represents the so-called general rule exemption, discussed in
49
greater detail below.
The negative declaration is a written statement that briefly describes
the reasons why a proposed project will not have a significant effect
on the environment and does not require the preparation of an EIR.1°
In No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, the California Supreme Court
stated that a determination that a project will not have a significant
impact on the environment must take the form of a written negative
declaration. 2 The negative declaration serves an important function
of providing the public with notice and capacity to review project
decisions by the various public agencies and to question or challenge
those decisions when appropriate. 3 If the initial study shows that the
project may have a significant effect, the lead agency takes the third
4
step and prepares an EIR.1
B.

The EIR

At the heart of CEQA is the requirement that an EIR be generated
for any project which may have a significant effect on the
environment. 5 The EIR can be viewed as an environmental "alarm

44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id.
"Lead agency" means the public agency that has the principal responsibility for carry-

ing out or approving a project which may have a significant effect on the environment. CAL.
PuB. REs. CODE §21067. For an extensive look at the concept of lead agency, see the State
CEQA Guidelines. CAL. ADMIn. CODE tit. 14, §§15050-15053.
47. CAL. Antm. CODE tit. 14, §15002(k)(2).
48. Id.; CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §21064 (definition of negative declaration).
49. See infra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
50. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §21064.
51. 13 Cal. 3d 68, 529 P.2d 66, 118 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1974).
52. Id. at 80, 529 P.2d at 73-74, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 41-42 (emphasis added).
53. Id. at 86, 529 P.2d at 78, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 46.
54. CAL. ADMoN. CODE tit. 14, §15002(k)(3).
55. See County of Inyo v. Yorty, 32 Cal. App. 3d 795, 809, 810, 108 Cal. Rptr. 377,
387, 388 (1973).
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bell" to alert the public and its responsible officials to environmental
changes before they have reached ecological points of no return.' 6
The purposes of the EIR are several: (1) to assist governmental
decision-makers in analyzing the significant environmental effects of
a proposed project; (2) to identify alternatives; and (3) to disclose
ways to reduce or avoid the possible environmental damage." Judicial
interpretations of the EIR requirement have resulted in broad,
expansive holdings and policy declarations." For example, the purpose of the EIR has been described by courts as follows: (1) to inform other governmental agencies and the public generally of the environmental impact of a proposed project; 9 (2) to demonstrate to
an apprehensive citizenry that the agency in fact has analyzed and
considered the ecological implications of its action; 60 and (3) to enable
the public to determine the environmental and economic values of
their elected and appointed officials, thus allowing for appropriate
6
action on election day. '
A comparison of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
and the NEPA environmental impact statement (EIS) provision with
the EIR provision of CEQA reveals a consistency of design and
purpose.63 This similarity has often led California courts to rely on
federal legislative standards and judicial precedents that require the
EIS to promote the general welfare and to maintain and restrict alterations in the environment .6 The basic standards under both NEPA
and CEQA mandate that the EIS and EIR include a detailed statement setting forth the foreseeable environmental impact and viable
6
alternatives to the proposed action. 1

56. Id.
CAL. PuB. RFs. CODE §21061.
58. See County of Inyo v. Yorty, 32 Cal. App. 3d 795, 810, 108 Cal. Rptr. 377, 388
(1973); Friends of Mammoth, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 271-72, 502 P.2d 1049, 1065, 104 Cal. Rptr.
761, 777 (1972); Russian Hill Improvement Ass'n v. Board of Permit Appeals, 44 Cal. App.
3d 158, 165, 118 Cal. Rptr. 490, 495, 498 (1974).
59. No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 13 Cal. 3d 68, 86, 529 P.2d 66, 78, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 34, 46 (1974) (citing with approval, County of Inyo v. Yorty, 32 Cal. App. 3d 795,
810, 108 Cal. Rptr. 377, 388 (1973)).
60. Id.
61. People v. County of Kern, 39 Cal. App. 3d 830, 841-42, 115 Cal. Rptr. 67, 75 (1974).
62. 42 U.S.C. §4321-4370.
63. Compare id. §4332 with CAL. PUB. Rs. CODE §21061.
64. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Coastside County Water District, 27 Cal. App.
3d 695, 701, 104 Cal. Rptr. 197, 200 (1972).
65. 42 U.S.C. §4332(c)(i), (iii); CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §21061.

57.
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The informational importance of the EIR cannot be emphasized
strongly enough. Recognizing this fact, a California Court of Appeal, in Russian Hill Improvement Association v. Board of Permit
Appeals,6" found that the preparation of an EIR is the single most
important requirement of CEQA.67 The importance of the EIR is
illustrated further by judicial pronouncements that the EIR should
be prepared as early in the planning process as possible to allow environmental considerations to influence decision-makers in approving
or disapproving projects. 61 Since the EIR is the paramount informational mechanism provided by CEQA, an understanding of the
availability and applicability of the various exemptions to the EIR
requirement is necessary.
C. Exemptions to the EIR Requirement
The threshold determination in CEQA is whether a proposed activity
must undergo the EIR process or is exempted from CEQA procedures
altogether. 69 An improper decision at this stage can allow a potentially significant environmental activity to be undertaken without careful
assessment of its possible environmental effects."0 The exemption
scheme under CEQA can be divided into three general classifications:
statutory exemptions, categorical exemptions, and those projects exempted under the "general rule."
1. Statutory Exemptions Under CEQA
Statutory exemptions are those expressly provided within CEQA,
enacted by the California Legislature. 7' Existing law provides nineteen classes of projects that in whole or in part, are statutorily free
from the requirements of CEQA. 72 Perhaps the most important of

66. 44 Cal. App. 3d 158, 118 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1974).
67. Id. at 165, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 495.
68. See Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Commission, 13 Cal. 3d 263, 282-83, 529
P.2d 1017, 1030, 118 Cal. Rptr. 249, 262 (1975).
69. See supra notes 42-54 and accompanying text.
70. The California Supreme Court has stfted that "where there is any reasonable possibility

that a project or activity may have a significant effect on the environment, an exemption would
be improper." Wildlife Alive v. Chickering, 18 Cal. 3d 190, 206, 553 P.2d 537, 545, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 377, 385 (1976).
71. CAL. PuB. Rys. CODE §§21080-21080.13, 21102, 21150, 21169-21172.
72. Id. The CEQA Guidelines explain that the statutory exemptions are either complete
exemptions, partial exemptions, or exemptions applying only to the timing of CEQA compliance. CAL. ADuwn.
CODE tit. 14, §15260.
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these statutory exemptions provides that CEQA only applies to projects involving discretionary governmental actions." Thus, nondiscretionary projects are entirely outside the CEQA process. Even discretionary actions may be exempt, however, provided another statutory,
categorical, or "general rule" exemption applies. Examples of statutory
exemptions include the following: ministerial actions,7 4 actions taken
under certified state regulatory programs,7" various emergency actions,7 6
actions relating to feasibility and planning studies, 77 and actions disapproving projects."
2.

Categorical Exemptions Under CEQA

Categorical exemptions," on the other hand, include only those
classes of projects that have been determined to have no significant
effect on the environment." Unlike the statutory exemptions enacted
by the Legislature, these classes of projects are prepared by the Office
of Planning and Research and adopted by the Secretary of the
Resources Agency, pursuant to the CEQA mandate.8" The rationale
behind the categorical exemptions is sound: administrative resources
should not be wasted on environmental analysis regarding projects
which have been determined in advance not to have a significant effect
on the environment.12 This use of exempt categories has enabled agencies to carry out or approve most minor or routine projects without
being required to conduct individual environmental studies. 3 Examples
of some of the thirty existing categorical exemptions include: replacement or reconstruction of existing facilities," projects classified as

73. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §21080(a) (exempting non-discretionary projects from CEQA).
The CEQA Guidelines define a "discretionary project" as "a project which requires the exercise of judgment or deliberation when the public agency or body decides to approve or disap-

prove a particular activity, as distinguished from situations where the public agency or body
merely has to determine whether there has been conformity with applicable statutes, ordinances,
or regulations." CAL. ADMuN. CODE tit. 14, §15357.
74. CAL. PUB. Ros. CODE §21080(b)(1).

75. Id. §21080.5.
76.
77.

Id. §§21080(b)(2), (3), (4), 21172.
Id. §21102.

78. Id. §21080(b)(5).
79. See generally CAL.
CEQA).
80.
81.

ADm.

CODE

tit. 14, §§15300-15329 (categorical exemptions under

Id. §15300.
CAL. PuB. Ras. CODE §§21083, 21084.

82. See Bendix, A Short Introduction To The California Environmental Quality Act, 19
L. R~v., 521, 524 (1979).
83. See Comment, supra note 13, at 853.
84. CAL. ADMiN. CODE tit. 14, §15302.

SANTA CLAA
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minor, 5 new construction or conversion of small structures, 6 specified
actions taken by regulatory agencies,87 and designations of wilderness
areas."8
The categorical exemptions have been criticized by commentators
and challenged in the courts.8 9 The major arguments against the propriety of these exemptions are that: (1) no proper finding has been

made to exempt certain classes of projects; 9° (2) the exemptions are

overbroad;9 ' and (3) the use of exempt categories has created serious
difficulties resulting from variations in the interpretation and application of the categories by public agencies. 92 At one time, the Resources
Agency seriously considered classifying the categorical exemptions as
rebuttable presumptions.93 In spite of these arguments, however, the
number, scope, and apparent use of these categorical exemptions con94
tinue to increase.
3.

The "General Rule" Exemption

Finally, when a specific project does not fit one of the express
statutory or categorical exemptions, thus triggering the second step
in the CEQA process, the "general rule" exemption still may apply. 95
This "general rule" will exclude a proposed project from review if
evidence can be put forth to show with certainty that the activity
in question poses no possibility of having a significant effect on the
environment. 96 Unlike the categorical exemptions that are determined
in advance to present no significant effect on the environment, the
general rule exemption requires case-by-case analysis to determine
whether the project is exempted. While some CEQA decision-makers

85. Id. §§15304 (minor alterations to land), 15305 (minor alterations in land use situations), 15314 (minor additions to schools), 15315 (minor land divisions).
86. Id.§15303.
87. Id. §§15307, 15308, 15321.
88. Id. §15318.
89. See Comment, California'sEnvironmental Quality Act - A Significant Effect Or Paper
Pollution?, 5 PAC. L. J. 26, 39-40 (1974).
90. Id. at 39.
91. Id.at 40.
92. See Comment, supra note 13, at 853.
93. See California Resources Agency, California EIR Monitor 8 (Sept. 10, 1981) (vol. 8,
No. 15).
94. For example, according to an index of the categorical exemptions produced by the
Resources Agency in 1974, the State CEQA Guidelines contained 12 categorical exemptions.
Id.EIR Monitor 4 (Jan. 11, 1974) (vol. 1. No. 3).
95. CAL. ADumJ. CODE tit. 14, §15061(b)(3).
96. Id.
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have been reluctant to use this rule due to its vagueness and questionable statutory origin, others have used it for years without
challenge.97 One commentator considers use of the "general rule" to
be a calculated risk. 98 Regardless of whether a statutory, categorical,
or "general rule" exemption is employed in a given situation, the
effect of the exemption decision is the same: the provisions of CEQA
requiring generation of an EIR are rendered inapplicable.
The specific exemptions of concern in this comment are the statutory
emergency exemptions. 99 Absent judicial interpretation of these provisions, administrators have been left to construe these exemptions
independently according to their own conception of the scope and
the legislative intent supporting the exemptions. To ascertain the manner in which the statutory emergency exemptions should be construed
and applied, an analysis of cases interpreting similar provisions is
required.
4.

Judicial Treatment of CEQA Exemption Decisions

A series of well-reasoned California decisions has strictly construed
the provisions of CEQA within the context of analyzing various
exemption decisions by public agencies. By doing so, these courts have
reiterated the proposition stated in Friends of Mammoth that CEQA
is to be interpreted to afford the fullest possible protection to the
environment.' 0 Most important among these cases is Wildlife Alive
v. Chickering,'1' decided by the California Supreme Court in 1976.
The issue before the court was whether the setting of hunting and
fishing seasons by the California Fish and Game Commission was
an action to which CEQA applied."0 2 The court observed that no express exemption, either statutory or categorical, applied to the facts
presented."0 3 Accordingly, the court relied largely on a well-accepted
rule of statutory construction and legislative intent to find that an
implied exemption also would be improper.0 4
The rule applied by the court is the doctrine of expressio unius
0 5 According to this doctrine, the creation of a
est exclusio alterius.'
limited express exemption suggests that a broader implied exemption
Bendix, supra note 82, at 525.
Id.
99. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §§21080(b)(2), (3), (4), 21172.
100. 8 Cal. 3d 247, 259, 502 P.2d 1049, 1056, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761, 768 (1972).
101. 18 Cal. 3d 190, 553 P.2d 537, 132 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1976).
102. Id. at 195, 553 P.2d at 538-39, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 206, 553 P.2d at 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
105. The doctrine of expressio unis est exclusio alteriusis a maxim of statutory interpreta97.
98.

1100
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could not have been intended.'0 6 The express exemption, pertaining
to certified state regulatory programs that allow certain agencies to
follow special abbreviated procedures, was interpreted to imply a rejection of other exemptions not expressly granted in CEQA. °7 The
importance of the EIR again was illustrated by the declaration of
the court that if the EIR provision were not applied, no other provision of the law would require a consideration of reasonable
alternatives. ' 08
The Wildlife Alive court analyzed the applicability of both statutory
and categorical exemptions. The statutory exemption allowing a
specified alternative review process for qualified agencies having important environmental protection responsibilities' 9 seemingly was applicable to the Commission. Due to the fact that the Commission
had not applied for and adopted an alternative regulatory program,
however, the court found that the statutory exemption was
inapplicable." 0 Perhaps more interesting was the discussion by the
court of the categorical exemption"' sought to be utilized. In describing
the legislative and administrative process by which categorical exemptions are established," 2 the court stated the general rule that no administrative regulation is valid if its issuance exceeds the scope of
the legislative enabling statute.'' 3 In other words, since the Secretary
of the Resources Agency is empowered by statute to exempt only those
activities that do not have a significant effect on the environment,
any regulation that exempts a project which may significantly affect
the environment, of necessity, must fail as exceeding the scope of
the enabling statute. The court openly doubted whether the categorical
exemption in question was authorized." 4 In light of the finding that
the categorical exemption sought to be applied was inapplicable to
the facts presented, the court was not required to determine its
validity. ' I
tion meaning that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of the other. BLACK'S LAW Dic521 (5th ed. 1979). Under this maxim, if a statute specifies one exception to a general

TIONARY

rule or assumes to specify the effects of a certain provision, other exceptions or effects are
excluded. Id.
106. 18 Cal. 3d at 196, 553 P.2d at 539-40, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 380.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 197, 553 P.2d at 540, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 380-81.
109. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §21080.5.
110. See 18 Cal. 3d at 199, 205, 553 P.2d at 541-42, 545, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 383, 385.
111. CAL. ADrenN. CODE tit. 14, §15313.
112. 18 Cal. 3d at 204, 553 P.2d at 544-45, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 384-85; see CAL. PuB. REs.
CODE

113.
114.
115.

§21084.
Id. at 205, 553 P.2d at 545, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
Id.
See id. at 205-206, 553 P.2d at 545, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
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In addition, the Wildlife Alive court stated that use of an exemption is improper whenever any reasonable possibility exists that a project may have a significant effect on the environment. 1 6 Furthermore,
the California Supreme Court would not abandon the "fullest possible protection" standard of Friends of Mammoth by unreasonably
expanding regulatory language to imply an exemption." 7 The Wildlife
Alive decision demonstrates the substantial deference to the important legislative intent provision of CEQA that California courts must
recognize in adjudicating disputes relating to CEQA.
Another case that strictly construed the categorical exemptions of
the State CEQA Guidelines is Myers v. Board of Supervisors,III decided
by the California Court of Appeal in 1976. Myers dealt with the problem raised by individual counties, cities, or other public entities,
developing and implementing their own environmental guidelines, purportedly in conformity with CEQA and the State CEQA Guidelines." 9
Specifically, the court held that Santa Clara County had misclassified
projects known as "minor land divisions" by including them in an
exempt category. 2 ' The court pointed out that the "minor land division" in question would involve fairly extensive changes to a currently natural area, including grading of a steep hillside, placing of storm
drains and utility poles in steep terrain and across a stream, and possible creation of a severe fire hazard.' 2 '
One commentator has observed that the State CEQA Guideline
directing individual agencies or entities to list those classes of categories
that they feel fall within the exempt categories, causes problems regarding uniformity.122 The problem lies in the divergent interpretations
given to the categories, each according to subjective perceptions of
agency functions. Thus, a project that is nonexempt by one agency
may be exempt by another, even though no real differences exist
between the two projects.' 2 3

116. Id. at 206, 553 P.2d at 545, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
117. Id.
118. 58 Cal. App. 3d 413, 129 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1976).
119. California Public Resources Code section 21082 provides that: "all public agencies
shall adopt by ordinance, resolution, rule, or regulation, objectives, criteria, and procedures
for the evaluation of projects and the preparation of environmental impact reports and negative
declarations pursuant to . . . [CEQA]."

120. 58 Cal. App. 3d at 423, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
121. Id. at 426, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 909.
122. See Comment, supra note 13, at 853-54. To avoid this problem, the author suggested
that public agencies should not be given the discretion to determine the applicability of CEQA
to entire project categories. Id. at 854. Instead, agencies should be permitted to make these
determinations only within strictly prescribed limits. Id.
123. See id. at 853.
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Since classification of a project as exempt removes it from the ambit
of CEQA, incorrect classification can have serious consequences.
Recognizing that this situation hindered the CEQA goal of statewide
protection of the environment through uniform application of CEQA
regulations, the Myers court was outraged by the apparent misuse
of the beneficent CEQA legislation.' 24 "What is most clearly
demonstrated by the instant case," the Myers court remarked, "is
the reluctance of local agencies to acknowledge as real the dangers
to the environment which compelled the legislature in 1970 to enact
emergency legislation [CEQA].' 25 The court considered the
misclassification of projects as either categorically exempt or as a
ministerial action to be one of the easiest methods for evading the
CEQA process.' 26 The court concluded by cautioning that misuse and
nonuse of the CEQA provisions may be avoided (and clearly should
be avoided) by complying strictly with the provisions of CEQA. 27
The 1977 case of City of Coronado v. California CoastalZone Conservation Commission'28 provides further judicial support for the proposition that CEQA exemption provisions are to be strictly construed.
The court in this case framed the central issue in conspicuously familiar
terms: whether in the absence of an express exemption, an implied
exemption may be inferred.' 29 After examining pertinent CEQA statutes
and application of recognized maxims of statutory construction, the
court answered this question with an unqualified "no.""'3 Consistent
with the holdings in Wildlife Alive and Myers, the court in City of
Coronado stated that when a statute expresses certain exceptions to
a general rule, other exceptions are necessarily excludeZd.' 3' The court
concluded that the permit-granting function of the California Coastal
Commission is an activity subject to the EIR requirements of CEQA.' 32
The action taken by the Commission, therefore, in implying an
exemption to CEQA, was contrary to the legislative intent and thus
33
constituted a void act.'
Recent cases, both upholding and rejecting agency use of categorical
exemptions, provide additional discussion of the standards to be ap124. See 58 Cal. App. 3d at 431, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 912.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
69 Cal. App. 3d 570, 138 Cal. Rptr. 241 (1977).
Id. at 579, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
Id.
Id. at 580, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 247; see supra notes 101-27 and accompanying text.

132.

Id. at 581-82, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 248-49.

133.

Id. at 583, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
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plied in complying with CEQA and the scope of agency authority
to declare exemptions. 3 ' The above mentioned cases, however, provide ample authority for the proposition that exemption decisions are
not to be made casually. Members of the California judiciary have
demonstrated that they will continue to construe exemption provisions strictly in accordance with the CEQA framework.' Having
developed the posture of the courts in the general context of CEQA
exemptions, this comment will analyze the specific class of exemptions known as the emergency exemptions.
D. Emergency Exemptions Under CEQA
Of the specific statutory exemptions contained in CEQA, three
directly pertain to emergencies. 136 These emergency exemptions are
embodied in two sections of the Public Resources Code.' The Code
sections provide that CEQA shall not apply to the following types
of projects: (1) emergency repairs to public service facilities necessary
to maintain service; ' (2) projects undertaken, carried out, or approved by a public agency to maintain, repair, restore, demolish, or
replace property or facilities damaged or destroyed as a result of a
disaster in a disaster-stricken area in which a state of emergency has
been proclaimed by the Governor; 3 9 and (3) specific actions necessary
to prevent or mitigate an emergency. 1' 0 To assist in the proper ap41
plication of these provisions, CEQA defines the term "emergency."1
The essential components of an emergency are as follows: a sudden,
unexpected occurrence, involving a clear and imminent danger, demanding immediate action to prevent or mitigate loss of, or damage to
life, health, property, or essential public services." 2 The CEQA defini-

134. See generally International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, Local 35 v.
Board of Supervisors, 116 Cal. App. 3d 265, 276, 171 Cal. Rptr. 875, 882 (1981) (holding
the use of the categorical exemption provided by the CEQA Guidelines section 15308 was improper for a change in a county air pollution rule that allowed a doubling of the emissions
of nitrogen oxides); Dehne v. County of Santa Clara, 115 Cal. App. 3d 827, 845, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 753, 764 (1981) (holding the use of the categorical exemption provided by the CEQA
Guidelines section 15303 was proper for a replacement structure of substantially the same size,
in the same place, and for the same purpose, and when the record contains no evidence that
the project would have a significant effect on the environment).
135. See infra notes 100-34 and accompanying text.
136. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§21080(b)(2), (3), (4), 21172.
137. Id.
138. Id. §21080(b)(2).

139. Id. §§21080(b)(3), 21172.
140.

Id. §21080(b)(4).

141.

Id. §21060.3.

142.

Id.
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tion lists fire, flood, earthquake, riot, accident, and sabotage as examples of situations constituting an "emergency."' ' 1 3
As noted above, California appellate courts have not interpreted
the meaning and scope of the emergency exemptions. The public
agencies charged with applying CEQA, however, apparently have had
ample opportunity to interpret the meaning of these exemptions. 44
This agency interpretation has resulted in varying applications of the
emergency exemptions, giving rise to problems of multi-agency stan45
dards and lack of CEQA uniformity.'
At least in principle, the emergency exemptions are appropriate,
common sense provisions. The theory behind these exemptions is that
if a project arises for which the lead agency simply cannot complete
the requisite paperwork within the time constraints of CEQA, then
pursuing the project without complying with the EIR requirement is
justifiable.' 46 For example, if a dam is ready to burst or a fire is
raging out of control and human life is threatened as a result of delaying a project decision, application of the emergency exemption would
be proper.
All evidence points to the conclusion, however, that the emergency
exemptions are being applied in too liberal a manner and thus inconsistently with the policy of CEQA. '4 Experts see this misuse not as
isolated occurrences but as an apparent trend.' 4 8 CEQA contains the
framework for putting a halt to this trend. Changes are required,
however, to revitalize the pertinent provisions that are designed for
this very purpose. Most importantly among these is the "notice of
exemption" provision which, at present, is a significant deficiency
in the CEQA notice scheme.
E. The Problem of Notice Under CEQA: Are the Emergency
Exemptions Too Frequently Employed?
Under current law, neither a state nor a local public agency is required to file a "notice of exemption" upon declaring itself exempt

143. Id.
144. The word "apparently" is used here due to the mechanics of current notice provisions
under CEQA. See infra notes 149-60, and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
146. See 1983 CEQA Hearings Before the Assembly Committee On Natural Resources

(testimony of Nick Arguimbau, Attorney, Californians For A Better Environment) [hereinafter
referred to as CEQA Hearings] (copy on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
147. Id.
148. Id.
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from CEQA.'4 9 Nonetheless, a primary beneficial effect of filing a
notice of exemption, from the standpoint of the public in environmental protection, is the publication of agency exemption decisions.'"
Additionally, the filing of this document has the legal effect of triggering a shorter statute of limitations period on legal challenges to
the agency decision that the project is exempt from CEQA.' Therefore, an agency is faced with an interesting choice, the resolution of which will likely depend on the philosophical or political posture
of the specific agency. Filing the notice of exemption may result in
a challenge from the public or other governmental agency. This "risk"
is offset, however, by the strict time constraints within which a
challenge may be brought. A decision not to file the notice of exemption, on the other hand, may result in less attention being drawn
to the project, though a far greater time frame is provided within
which challenges may be brought.
This author suggests that the risk of a challenge to an agency
exemption decision should not enter into the decisional framework
of a public agency with responsibilities under CEQA. Considerations
of this nature are inappropriate in the CEQA context. When regulating
activities to give major consideration to preventing environmental
damage,"12 agencies should not only welcome, but actively solicit
responsible and informative input from the general public.' 3 The
absence of required notices of exemption further complicates the difficulties with the emergency exemptions highlighted in the preceding
section.'" The Tulare Lake Emergency Pumping Project, discussed
below,'" is a classic illustration of these complications.
While the CEQA notice provisions are optional for both state and

See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§21108(b) (state agency may file a Notice of Exemption
149.
upon a finding of non-applicability of CEQA), 21152(b) (local agency may file a Notice of
Exemption upon a finding of non-applicability of CEQA).

150.

"Publication" in this context, means the posting of the notice of exemption in either

the office of a county clerk or Office of the Secretary of the Resources Agency. See infra
notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
151. The CEQA Guidelines provide that the filing of a notice of exemption starts a 35
day statute of limitations period on legal challenges to the agency exemption decision. CAL.

ADmr. CODE tit. 14, §15062(d). If a notice of exemption is not filed, a 180 day statute of
limitations will apply. Id.
152. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §21000(g).

153.

In support of the proposition that the public is intended to play a vital role in the

CEQA process, see sources cited infra note 283. See generally Stein, Public Administration
ISSUES IN PuBLic ADMINISTRATION 27 (1978); Simon, Decision Making,
as Politics, in CurRT
in CURRENT ISSUES IN PUBLIC ADMINISmTATION 337 (1978); Edmund G. Brown Jr., A Society
of the People. And by. And For., in CURRENT IssuEs IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 493 (1978).
154. See supra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
155. See infra notes 161-232 and accompanying text.
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local agencies,' 6 the law provides different locations for filing notices
of exemption. Local agencies deciding to file a notice of exemption
must do so with the county clerk of each county in which the project
will be located. 5 7 State agencies deciding to file a notice of exemption, however, are required to file these notices with the Secretary
of the Resources Agency.' 58 Given the fact that actions taken by local
agencies in many instances may be far more extensive than those of
state agencies, no discernible reason exists for providing a convenient
central repository for state notices only. Thus, while the frequency
of use of the emergency exemptions is difficult to estimate for both
state and local agencies, the problem is especially acute in the case
of local agencies. '" A conservative estimate of state and local agency
use of emergency exemptions could be placed at several thousand over
the past five years.' 60 In addition, when agencies decide not to file
a notice of exemption, ascertaining what specific emergency exemption has been employed is often impossible. Absent mandatory filing
of a notice of exemption, therefore, the public is denied the opportunity to become involved in the review process to safeguard its interest. Notices of exemption warrant application of the same standards of environmental documentation as the EIR or Negative Declaration due to the importance of the exemption decision.
This comment has demonstrated that existing notice provisions under
CEQA represent an additional hurdle to the ability of the public to
challenge exemption decisions. The important question remaining is
whether agencies are properly invoking the emergency exemptions in
light of the provisions of CEQA and pertinent case law. Before
analyzing this specific question through the facts of the Tulare Lake
Emergency Pumping Project, a discussion of the events involved in
the project, important history, economic and environmental considerations will follow.

156. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §§21108(b), 21152(b).
157. Id. §21152(b).
158. Id. §21108(b).
159. This is due to the fact that offices of 58 California County Clerks would have to
be visited. The Notice of Exemption files in each office would have to be searched and tabulated
to determine the number of notices filed by local agencies. Of course, due to the optional
nature of the CEQA filing provision, the sum of all notices filed in these 58 offices would
represent only the number of notices actually filed, not the number of exemption decisions
actually made.
160. This is a rough estimate based on the number of notices of exemption filed by state
agencies with the Secretary of the Resources Agency in a recent one-year period. This search

alone took several hours of manual investigation by this author.
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THE TULARE LAKE PROJECT MODEL

The Tulare Lake Emergency Pumping or "dewatering" project is
a recent example of agency' use of a CEQA emergency exemption.
For purposes of analysis, this comment explores the relevant factual
background surrounding the project. 6 ' As an introductory note,
however, several brief comments will prove helpful. The essence of
the dewatering project consisted of a plan by several large California
agribusinesses to remove great quantities of floodwater that covered
otherwise prime agricultural lake bed land.'6 2 The project was an ambitious one, involving the dredging and widening of miles of river,
purchase and installation of massive pumps to drain the lake and
dispose of the water, and construction of a metal fish screen designed
to prevent a predatory species of bass from entering the SacramentoSan Joaquin Delta ecosystem, the final destination of the drained
floodwaters. 6 3 Many months of planning were devoted to the pumping project that was estimated to cost the growers $12 million.' 64
Significantly more than this5 sum was at stake, however, to the growers
and the local economy.

16

Despite the tremendous potential impact on the environment, the
project was declared exempt from the CEQA EIR requirements. Tulare

Lake Reclamation District 749 (TLRD 749), the lead agency involved
in the pumping project, determined that the gubernatorial declara-

tion of emergency made in response to the floods of the previous
winter triggered application of the declaration of emergency exemp166
tion, thereby rendering CEQA inapplicable to the pumping project.
Upon finding CEQA inapplicable, substantial public concern and legal
challenges followed. The predominant concern was expressed by
fisheries biologists: if the predatory white bass were introduced to
the Delta estuary, a significant threat would be presented to the
maintenance and survival of the highly valued salmon and striped
bass commercial and sport fisheries.' 6 7 In addition, criticism was made
regarding the administrative processes designed to ensure environmental
review of projects posing environmental risks.' 68 This comment will
161. See infra notes 162-234 and accompanying text.
162. San Francisco Chronicle, Aug. 26, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
163. Id. at 1, col. 1, 4, col. 1-4.
164.

Los Angeles Times, Oct. 7, 1983, Part. 1, at 3, col. 1.

165. Sacramento Bee, Oct. 23, 1983, at A22, col. 1; see also notes 225-26 and accompanying text.
166. Telephone conversation with Norma Wood, Office of Planning and Research (Oct.
17, 1983) (notes on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
167. See infra notes 227-32 and accompanying text.
168. San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 8, 1983, at 22, col. 1.
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discuss in further detail the important factual data, economic and
environmental considerations and chronology of this project. By so
doing, a complete picture of the application of the emergency
exemption may be drawn.
A.

History of Tulare Lake and Area Flooding

Tulare Lake is a naturallake located in Kings County, in the San
Joaquin Valley.' At one time it was the largest lake in California,
covering up to 800 square miles.' 70 During the latter part of the nineteenth century, Tulare Lake was considered to be a permanent part
of the geography of the state. 71 Early reports described the lake as
navigated, with docks at several locations, and as actively fished on
a commercial basis.' 72 Beginning in the 1880s, water diversions from
the rivers feeding Tulare Lake and the construction of levees began
to allow reclamation of the lake bed for agricultural use.' 1" A 1947
report of the Bureau of Reclamation indicates that over twenty
reclamation districts were formed between 1896 and 1925 to assist
in the reclamation of the lake bed and to prevent large areas from
7
being inundated when new floods occurred. 1
Although operating with considerable hazard from both flood and
drought, the Tulare Lake area was developed and farmed many years
prior to the completion of federal flood control reservoirs on the
tributary streams in 1962. 71 Despite these flood control reservoirs,
however, periodic floods of large magnitude remain a significant part
of farming life in the Tulare Lake Basin. 76 In wet years, therefore,
the lake expands within its natural lake bed, and land that can be
farmed in drier years is inundated. Significant flooding has occurred
in ten of the twenty-eight years from 1954 through 1981.
Because
1982-83 was a wet year, approximately 126 square miles (81,600 acres)
of lake bottom were flooded under roughly 710,000 acre-feet of

169.

See Army Corps of Engineers, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, Application No. 8370,

Reclamation District 749 (Oct. 7, 1983) [hereinafter cited as ENVIRONMENTAL AssESSMENT].
170. See Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District, Report on Irrigation, Drainage and
Flooding In The Tulare Lake Basin 4 (Sept. 1981), Appendix 4"of ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSlMENT, supra note 169 [hereinafter referred to as Appendix 4].
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 5.
176. Id. at 37.
177. Id.
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water.'
To understand the effect of these periodic floods on the
typical land owner in the Tulare Lake Basin, a look at land ownership in the Tulare region is necessary.
B. Land Ownership in the Tulare Lake Area
On a purely hydrographic basis, 17 9 the Tulare Lake area could be
described at the present time as an area of approximately 250,000
acres or 390 square miles.' 0 A 1981 report by the Tulare Lake Basin
Water Storage District stated that four operators farm more than ninety
percent of the Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District assessed
acreage, while a total of eight operators farm nearly ninety-eight percent of the area.' 8 ' The characteristic farm operation in the Tulare
Lake area, therefore, consists of large holdings of land owned by
the operator, plus a substantial amount of land leased from absentee
landowners.' 82 In the classic sense, no small "family farms" operate
in the Tulare Lake area.' 83 The Tulare Lake Emergency Pumping Project was carried out and approved by several of these large agricultural
landowners and TLRD 749.
C.

The Tulare Lake "Emergency" Pumping Project

TLRD 749 was the lead agency that planned and implemented the
Tulare Lake Emergency Pumping Project during 1983-84. The pumping
or "dewatering" project was designed to remove a major portion of
the water covering lake bed land.'1 4 TLRD 749 is a local agency, within
the meaning of CEQA,'8 5 organized and operated under provisions
of the California Water Code. 8 6 The primary responsibilities of the
district are to construct and maintain reclamation facilities for the
benefit of persons and companies owning land within the district in
87
the Tulare Lake bed.1
178. See Tulare Lake Reclamation District 749, Kings River Emergency Pumping Project
1-2 (Sept. 1983), in Appendix 1 of ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 169 [hereinafter
referred to as Appendix 1].
179. Hydrography is the description, measurement, and study of seas, lakes, rivers and
other bodies of water. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1109 (1976).
180. Appendix 4, supra note 170, at 4.
181. Id. at 8.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 169, at 1.
185. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §21062 (definition of local agency).
186. See CAL. WATER CODE §§50000-53901.
187. See id.§50652. Though TLRD 749 is composed of 8 members, it is dominated by
two large farming companies, Salyer American and the J.G. Boswell Co. See Los Angeles Times,
Oct. 7, 1983, at 3, col. 1.
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The specific goals of the "dewatering"

project were as follows:

(1) to reclaim the agricultural land then flooded in time for 1984 planting; (2) to lessen the likelihood of additional flooding during 1984;

and (3) to permit further maintenance on area levees.I ' s To accomplish
these goals, the south fork of the Kings River was dredged and widened

significantly.' 89 This channelization allowed the southward direction
of the river to be reversed, by the drawing out and pumping north-

ward of the great quantities of water then residing in Tulare Lake.' 9

In the process, the banks of the river were largely destroyed, including

trees of over one hundred years.' 9 ' Construction and installation of
the pumping stations soon followed. Through a series of locks and
dams, these pumps would lift the water twenty feet in elevation to
dispose of the water via the north fork of the Kings River, into the
San Joaquin River and eventually out to sea through the Sacramento-

San Joaquin Delta.

92

The pumping was intended to be continuous for approximately seven

months.' 93 When white bass were discovered in the floodwaters, a
massive fish kill quickly became part of the project. 94 Rotenone, a
chemical fatal to fish, but allegedly harmless to humans, was sprayed

from boats and helicopters, killing thousands of fish of many species.1 91
Before pumping resumed, the affected water had to be detoxified.'

96

While the primary objection to these project activities was the
possibility that predatory white bass from Tulare Lake would be in-

troduced into the Delta ecosystem, other concerns were also manifested.
The destruction of natural riparian habitat was especially disappointing to fishermen. Additionally, concern over water quality and pollution was prevalent. 97 Finally, considerable attention was drawn to
188. See Appendix 1, supra note 178, at 1-2.
189. See San Francisco Chronicle, Aug. 26, 1983, at 1, col. I, and at 4, col. 4.
190. See id. at 1, col. I, and at 4, col. 1.
191. See Los Angeles Times, Oct. 7, 1983, Part 1, at 23, col. 1.
192. See id. at 1, col. 6, and at 3, col. 1.
193. Under the terms of the permit issued by the Army Corps of Engineers, pumping was
to run no later than April 7, 1984, or whenever the Fish and Game Department determined
that white bass were about to begin spawning. Sacramento Bee, Jan. 11, 1984, at AA4, co. 1-2.
194. See id., Oct. I1, 1983, at A4, col. 1.
195. Id.
196. See id., Oct. 16, 1983, at A23, col. 1-2.
197. An interesting question raised by this project is whether or not the project involves
a "discharge" within the meaning of the State Water Quality Act, and further, whether the
discharge is a "waste." Although the California Water Code does not define "discharge,"
the State Water Resources Control Board has defined the terms very broadly. "Waste" is defined
as including: "sewage and any and all other waste substances, liquid, solid, gaseous, or radioactive, associated with human habitation, or of human or animal origin..... " CAL. WATER
CODE §13050(d). Under the reasoning of an opinion of the Attorney General, the conclusion
could be reached that the water pumped from Tulare Lake, with the white bass, constitutes
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the possible effects on humans resulting from the spraying of the
rotenone. 19' The threat to the Delta fisheries, though, was clearly the

most significant. Estimates place the economic value of the salmon
and striped bass populations at well over $10 million annually. 199 As

these economic and environmental concerns became fully established,
the Tulare Lake Pumping Project attracted both extensive media and
litigation-oriented attention.
D.

The Controversy, Chronology, and Federal Involvement

The Tulare Lake Pumping Project was planned, designed, and constructed in large part prior to any federal or state agency
involvement. 00 Only when news of this project became public
throughout the state by newspaper publications, did several impor-

tant federal and state agencies learn of the project. 20 '
Since the pumping activity was subject to the concurrent authority

of lioth federal and state agencies,20 2 proponents of the pumping pro-

ject were required to satisfy the provisions of both NEPA and
CEQA. 20 3 Rather than pursue a course of active compliance with the
state and federal requirements, TLRD 749 remained passive. The chief
administrator of TLRD 749 was quoted as stating: "we assumed that
if the District needed a permit, I would be told.

'2 4

This statement

clearly reveals the failure of certain public agency decision-makers
to uphold the duties of their agency conscientiously. Regarding the

application of CEQA, TLRD 749 argued that it was under no obligation to prepare an EIR due to the claimed emergency exemption.20 s

a discharge of waste. See 43 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 302, 304 (June 18, 1969). On Oct. 14, 1983,
waste discharge requirements were ordered for the pumping project. See California Regional
Water Quality Control Board - Central Valley Region, order No. 83-128 (Oct. 14, 1983) (copy
on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
198. See Letter from Sally Tanner, Chairwoman of the Assembly Committee on Consumer
Protection and Toxic Materials, to Howard D. Carper, Former Director, California Dept. of
Fish and Game (Oct. 12, 1983) (expressing serious public health and environmental concerns
regarding the use of the pesticide Rotenone) (copy on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
199. ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 169, at 4. The economic value of the Delta
fisheries, like the annual anticipated revenues from farming Tulare Lake bed land, runs into
the tens of millions of dollars. Sacramento Bee, Oct. 23, 1983, at A22, col. 1.
200. See Sacramento Bee, Nov. 30, 1983, at A5, col. 1-2. The pumping project was being
worked on approximately 6 months prior to the "discovery" of white bass in Tulare Lake.
See Los Angeles Times, Oct. 7, 1983, at 3, col. 1.
201. See Sacramento Bee, Nov. 30, 1983, at A5, col. 1-2.
202. See CAL. ADMN. CODE tit. 14, §15220.
203. Id.
204. Sacramento Bee, Nov. 30, 1983, at AS, col. 2.
205. See Department of the Army, Permit Application No. 8370 (permit effective date Oct.
7, 1983).
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The concern over the environmental impact of this project led both
the United States Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine
Fisheries Service to request that the Army Corps of Engineers require
TLRD 749 to obtain a section 404 permit for the project.20 6 The section 404 permit process under the Federal Clean Water Act 2 7 regulates
the discharge of dredged or fill material into the waters of the United
States.2"8 This process also requires inter-agency consultation and public
involvement. 20 9 In exercising its jurisdiction over navigable bodies of
water, the Corps advised TLRD 749 that it must obtain a section
404 permit before it could begin pumping the floodwaters. 210 The
Corps, however, did not issue an order stopping the dredging and
construction that already was under way. Following submittal of the
application by TLRD 749 for the 404 permit, the Corps decided that
an "emergency situation" existed and prescribed special processing
procedures. 2 1' Under these procedures, the public review and comment period, a crucial component of federal environmental regulations, was reduced from the normal thirty days to eight days. 21 2 Shortly
after the comment period was closed, the Corps announced that no
EIS would be prepared because the project would have "no signifi2 3 A section 404 permit was issued 21 1
cant impact on the environment."
and the project pumping began immediately.21 5
On September 19, 1983, the Sierra Club and the Environmental
Defense Fund filed suit in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of California seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.2 ,6
Specifically, plaintiffs sought a judgment declaring that section 404
permit procedures were not complied with and enjoining the Army
Corps of Engineers from granting the 404 permit.21 7 On October 19,
1983, these plaintiffs, joined by Assemblyman Phil Isenberg, lost their
bid for a temporary restraining order to halt the pumping recently
206. See ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 169, at 12; see also 33 U.S.C. §1344 (section 404 permit required under the Clean Water Act).
207. 33 U.S.C. §§1251-1376.
208. Id.
209. Id. See generally Blumm, Wetlands Preservation, Fish and Wildlife Protection, and
404 Regulation: A Response, 18 LAND AND WATER L. REV. 469, 485-86 (1983) (defending the
permit program against charges of bureaucratic red tape and overregulation).
210. ENVIRONMENTAL AssEssMENT, supra note 169, at 12.
211. Id. at 13; see 47 Fed. Reg. 31819 (1982) (codified at 33 C.F.R. §325.2(e)(4)).
212. See 47 Fed. Reg. 31819 (1982) (codified at 33 C.F.R. §325.2(e)(4)).
213. See "Findingsof No SignificantImpact" in ENVmONmENrAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 169.

214.

See Department of the Army, Permit (granted Tulare Lake Reclamation District 749

in response to application number 8370) (effective date Oct. 7, 1983).
215. Sacramento Bee, Oct. 7, 1983, at A3, col. 1.
216. Sierra Club v. Palladino, No. 83-4423 (N.D. Cal. filed Sept. 19, 1983).
217. Id. at 14.
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authorized by the Corps. The district court found that the Corps of
Engineers and TLRD 749 did not violate federal law by allowing com21 8
mencement of the pumping.
In opposition to the project, the plaintiffs argued that: (1) the threat
of introducing white bass into the Delta and subsequent ecological
effects on the Delta fisheries was great, even though a fish screen
was installed in an attempt to strain white bass out of the water being pumped; (2) no adequate environmental review transpired; (3) both
NEPA and CEQA requirements were being circumvented; (4) valuable
riparian habitats were being destroyed; (5) no discussion or analysis
of alternatives occurred prior to project authorization; and (6) no
emergency existed. 1 9 The defendants and others in favor of the project were primarily farmers, merchants, businessmen, and citizens from
the Tulare Lake area.220 The dominant argument posed by these individuals was economic.12' The dewatering of the lake would allow
22
the land to be farmed, resulting in benefit to the local economy.
A secondary argument pertained to the maintenance and repair of
levees, made possible through lowered lake levels. 23
While the purpose of this comment is to analyze the use or abuse
of the emergency exemptions under CEQA, this glance at federal involvement reveals clear cause for concern regarding significant
loopholes in the federal environmental scheme. In fact, as of this
writing, a subcommittee of the House of Representatives is holding
hearings on numerous categories of projects that can proceed without
satisfying permitting regulations.2 24 Before analyzing the application
of the CEQA emergency exemptions to the facts of the Tulare Lake
Project, this comment first must evaluate the relevant economic and
environmental considerations associated with the project.
E.

Tulare Lake Economic Considerations

The Kings and Tulare County area depends heavily on agriculture.
The environmental assessment prepared by the Army Corps of
Engineers under emergency processing procedures stated the estimated
gross income resulting from the successful completion of this project
218. See
219. See
concerns).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See
224. See
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Appendix 1, supra note 178, at 2.
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to be $30 million. 225 Furthermore, the application by TLRD 749 for
the Corps permit estimated that 1500 jobs would remain lost if the
project were not approved. 2 6 With these significant economic hardships
placed on the area economy, having the flooded land back in production as soon as possible clearly would be desirable. Given the unambiguous judicial position and legislative intent of CEQA that environmental values are to be assigned greater weight than economic
needs, the question remains whether the decision to proceed at the
local level was justified in light of the serious environmental risks
to the Delta and Kings River ecosystems.
F.

The Environmental and Economic Threat to the Delta

This comment has demonstrated that the pumping of floodwaters
from Tulare Lake raises the possibility that the predatory white bass
will be introduced to the Delta ecology. 22 7 White bass have become
well established in the Kaweah River, which feeds Tulare Lake, and
Tulare Lake itself. 228 Fisheries experts state that if given the opportunity, the white bass will thrive in the Sacramento and San Joaquin
Rivers, in the Delta, and in many Central Valley Reservoirs. 229 If the
white bass flourish in the Delta, a significant threat to the striped
bass, steelhead, and salmon commercial and sport fisheries of the Delta
is presented.2 30
The fundamental question is .whether permanent vitality of these
fisheries resources is worth more in economic and noneconomic terms
then a temporary loss of farmland. 21 3 Stated alternatively, the question is whether the fisheries are worth more than a chance that
the experimental fish barrier, installed to prevent introduction of white
bass into the Delta, will work. 23 2 Having discussed much of the perti225.
226.
227.
228.

See Findings of No SignificantImpact, in ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSM:ENT, supranote 169.
See Appendix 1, supra note 178, at 1.
Id. at 12; see supra note 163, 199 and accompanying text.
See Declaration of Dr. Peter B. Moyle, Wildlife and Fisheries Biologist 3 (Sept. 1983),
in Appendix 7a of ENVIROM NTAL AssEssmENT, supra note 169 [hereinafter referred to as
Appendix 7a].
229. Id.
230. See id. at 5-8; see also Sacramento Bee, Oct. 23, 1983, at A22, col. I (stating further
that the estimated annual worth of the commercial and sport salmon industry is $10 million).
In light of the additional likelihood that the white bass would migrate up the eight rivers flowing

to the Delta, including the Sacramento and its major tributaries like the American, the threat
posed by the escape of white bass from Tulare Lake is truly of statewide proportions. See id.
231. Assemblyman Phillip Isenberg, Pumping Tulare Lake Water To the Delta, A Tragedy

in the Making, (Oct. 26, 1983) (copy on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
232. See Appendix 7a, supra note 228, at 9 (stating that the Tulare pumping project will
be an experiment on a grand scale, without any control and without the approval of biologists

charged with managing our fisheries); see Declaration of Charles Wagner, Consulting Engineer,
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nent project information, this comment will continue by setting forth
arguments in favor of strict construction of the emergency exemptions.
THE

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-LEGIsLATIvE

INTENT ARGUMENT

In those instances in which particular statutes have not been litigated,

the meaning and intent of those statutes may be debated. The function of rules of statutory construction is to ascertain the legislative
intent, as expressed in the statutory language. 233 The purpose of determining legislative intent is to allow courts or other interpreting entities to effectuate the purpose of the law involved. 3
Generally, all rules of construction assume some statutory ambiguity
or uncertainty, since no need arises to apply rules of construction
for ascertaining legislative intent if the statutory language is clear and
unambiguous."' The emergency exemptions and definitional provisions of CEQA admit some degree of uncertainty, primarily relating
to the intended meaning and scope. Since CEQA provides a definition of "emergency," this definition must be used for purposes of
construction, as opposed to use of definitions of "emergency" in other
legal contexts or other code sections.236 The question posed with respect
to the Tulare Lake Project is whether the CEQA definition of
"emergency," requiring a sudden, unexpected occurrence involving
a clear and imminent danger to life, health, or property, is applicable
to the project. To answer this question, the emergency or perceived
emergency giving rise to the declaration of exemption by TLRD 749
must be identified. In the district court action to enjoin the Tulare
Project pumping operations, the plaintiffs argued that no emergency
existed, while the defendants contended that a serious economic
emergency was present. 237 Furthermore, one CEQA commentator
claims that any emergency that may have existed in the Tulare Lake
situation was entirely the result of actions taken by the reclamation

5-6 (Oct. 1983), Appendix 7b in ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT supra note 169 (hereinafter referred to as Appendix 7b) (expressing concern about the experimental nature of the fish screen
and the belief that a screening structure has never been built to prevent passage of 100% of
white bass).
233. H.S. Mann Corp. v. Moody, 144 Cal. App. 2d 310, 320, 301 P.2d 28, 35 (1956).
234. Hogya v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 75 Cal. App. 3d 122, 132, 142 Cal.
Rptr. 325, 332 (1977).
235. Smith v. Rhea, 72 Cal. App. 3d 361, 365, 140 Cal. Rptr. 116, 118 (1977).
236. See B.P. Schulberg Productions, Ltd. v. California Employment Commission, 66 Cal.
App. 2d 831, 835, 153 P.2d 404, 406 (1944) (example of a case using this general statutory rule).
237. See supra notes 200-24 and accompanying text.
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district itself. 238 Under this view, therefore, the project would not be
covered by the CEQA definition of emergency.
Significant flooding of Tulare Lake can be expected on the average
of one in every three years.2 39 The flooding that had already occurred
months prior to planning of the pumping project, therefore, was not0
24
a sudden, unexpected occurrence as required by the CEQA definition.
Similarly, the concern over lost revenues due to the inability to farm
flooded lake bed land cannot be characterized as a clear and imminent danger to life, health, property, or essential public services. 24 '
The Tulare Lake Project did not involve a situation in which lives
were threatened due to a dam break or a raging fire. The only threat
involved was that land owned by several large agribusiness conglomerates would remain out of production unless a quick means of
project approval could be secured. Use of the declaration of emergency
exemption by TLRD 749 served precisely this purpose. While the
CEQA definition of "emergency" includes the occurrence of floods,
the existing condition of flooding in the Tulare Basin posed no imminent threat to life or the long-term continued productivity of property. Thus, the CEQA definition was not applicable to the Tulare
Project, since the flood was not sudden, nor unexpected, nor imminently threatening harm.242
In construing statutes, courts do not sit as superlegislatures, questioning the wisdom or motive of legislative enactments. 243 Rather, the
role of the courts is to declare the law, not to make it. 244 A specific
presumption maintains that the legislature does not intend to legislate
by implication."' If the legislature had intended to include a provision relating to a given subject in the body of a statute, that intention would have been expressed.24 6 This construction is connected
closely with the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius,24 1 which
declares that the specific enumeration of acts, things, or persons as

238.
239.

See 1983 CEQA Hearings, supra note 146.
See supra notes 175-78 and accompanying text.
240. CAL. PuB. RFs. CODE §21060.3.
241. Id.
242. See id. §21060.3
243. Estate of Horman, 5 Cal. 3d 62, 77, 485 P.2d 785, 796, 95 Cal. Rptr. 433, 444 (1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1015 (Jan. 10, 1972).
244. Treppa v. Justice's Court of No. 3 Township, 1 Cal. App. 2d 374, 377, 36 P.2d 819,

820 (1934).
245.
246.
247.

Meier v. Superior Court of California, 67 Cal. App. 135, 140, 227 P. 490, 492 (1924).
Id.
See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
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coming within the operation of a statute will preclude the inclusion
by implication of other acts, things, or persons.248
Application of these rules leads to the conclusion that purely
economic emergencies or self-created emergencies are not covered by
this CEQA provision. Nowhere in the CEQA definition is any mention made, expressly or impliedly, regarding the economic concern
of lost revenues. In addition, in People v. Kern County,24 the court
held that economic hardship caused to the applicant by delays in getting
approval of a project under CEQA could not justify approval without
compliance with the law.25
As noted, the Tulare Project was planned, designed, and constructed
over a period of many months. Not until federal and state agencies
were informed of the project did TLRD 749 decide that an emergency
existed. The threatened delay from an environmental review process,
even though the delay was the result of TLRD 749 failing to apply
CEQA earlier, could have resulted in millions of dollars of lost revenue
if pumping were not completed by planting season. Thus, use of the
declaration of emergency exemption allowed the project to proceed.
As in the Kern County case, however, the economic hardship that
led to the Tulare Project did not justify proceeding with the project
under an emergency exemption.
TLRD 749 did not file a notice of exemption for the pumping project. The problem of ascertaining what specific exemption was found
applicable to this project, therefore, is raised. 2 1' Apparently, the
emergency exemption employed by TLRD 749 was the gubernatorial
declaration of emergency. 25 2 This comment has demonstrated that the
emergency exemptions dependent on the CEQA definition of
"emergency" were inapplicable to the Tulare Project because the project did not constitute a CEQA emergency. 5 3 When applying the
gubernatorial declaration of emergency exemption, application of the
CEQA definition of emergency also would appear improper. 5 4 In248. People v. Mancha, 39 Cal. App. 3d 703, 713, 144 Cal. Rptr. 392, 397 (1974).
249. 62 Cal. App. 3d 761, 133 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1976).
250. Id. at 776, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 399.
251. See supra notes 149-60 and accompanying text.
252. The word "apparently" must be used here because TLRD 749 did not file a notice
of exemption from which to determine the grounds for the exemption decision.
253. See supra notes 236-42 and accompanying text.
254. This is because the word "emergency" is not used in an independent manner as is
the case with the other emergency exemptions. Compare CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §§21080(b)(3),
21172 with id. §21080(b)(2), (4). The "declaration of emergency" exemptions employ the phrase
"state of emergency" and specifically require the meaning to be used pursuant to the "state
of emergency" provision in the Government Code. See id. §§21080(b)(3), 21172; CAL. Gov'T.
CODE §8625.
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stead, use of the definition provided by the California Emergency
Services Act25 would seem to effectuate more closely the legislative
intent as expressed in the exemption provision.256
The essential query, therefore, is whether the declaration of
emergency exemption applies to the facts of the Tulare Project. This
exemption applies to projects that respond to a disaster in a disasterstricken area in which a state of emergency has been proclaimed by
the Governor pursuant to the Emergency Services Act.25 According
to the Act, a "state of emergency" means the duly proclaimed existence of conditions of disaster or of extreme peril to the safety of
persons and property within the state caused by conditions such as
air pollution, fire, flood, storm, epidemic, riot, drought, sudden and
severe energy shortage, plant or animal infestation or disease, earthquake, or other conditions.2"' Whether this definition of emergency
covers the facts of the Tulare Project is tantamount to questioning
whether the gubernatorial proclamation of emergency, in response to
the flooding of forty-four California counties in 1982-83, was proper.259
In another sense, the question really is how long a "state of
emergency" remains in effect for CEQA purposes, as opposed to nonCEQA purposes.
The essential police power to declare a "state of emergency" in
appropriate circumstances, is based on the concern and responsibility
of government to provide for the health, safety, and welfare of its
citizenry. 260 Further discussion of the propriety of emergency proclamations is beyond the scope of this comment. Consideration must be
given, however, to the proper effect that an emergency declaration
is to have on project decisions under CEQA.
In addition to authorizing the Governor to declare a state of
emergency in appropriate situations, the Emergency Services Act further specifies that the Governor may suspend regulations when
necessary.26 ' While no case law exists pertaining to the scope of this
255.

CAL. GOV'T. CODE §§8550-8668.

256. CAL. PuB. REs.
257.

CODE

§§21080(b)(3), 21172.

Id.

258. CAL. GOV'T CODE §8558(b).
259. This may be somewhat of an overstatement. In a sense, since the legislature in Public
Resources Code sections 21080(b)(3) and 21172 has grafted the provisions of the Emergency
Services Act onto these CEQA emergency exemptions, the mere incantation of the "state of

emergency" by an agency can be argued as sufficient for exemption. In effect, this negates
the significant judicial gloss that, of necessity, overlays the use of all exemptions. See supra
notes 103-37 and accompanying text (discussion of Wildlife Alive, Myers, and City of Coronado cases).
260. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §8550(a).
261. See id. §8571.
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authority, an opinion of the California Attorney General in another
context states that the Emergency Services Act does not authorize the
Governor to suspend the operation of California wage law.262 As
CEQA provides for automatic suspension of the EIR requirement upon
application of the state of emergency exemption, the limitation on
the Governor's powers with respect to the wage law is merely instructive
from a policy standpoint.263 Just as the potential effect of a proclaimed
state of emergency was shown to be restricted by the Attorney
with regard to
General's opinion, the effect should also be2 restricted
64
the applicability of this CEQA exemption.
A recent federal case has interpreted "emergency" to determine
the applicability of a Disaster Relief Act definition of emergency to
NEPA. Colon v. Carter2 65 dealt with one aspect of the problems caused
by the influx of Cuban and Haitian refugees into Florida during 1980.
On May 6, 1980, President Carter issued a declaration of emergency
in response to this unusual event.26 6 The declaration was made following notices of violations of the Florida Sanitary Code pertaining to
overcrowding and improper sewage treatment in the camps where the
refugees were housed.2 67 The federal government devised a plan
whereby several thousand refugees were to be transferred to a location in Puerto Rico.2 68 This action was argued to be exempt from
the provisions of NEPA based on the Federal Disaster Assistance
Act.2 69 The Commonwealth of Puerto, Rico and others brought suit
to enjoin this project until an adequate environmental review
transpired.
262. See 54 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 31, 38 (1971).
263.

Given the importance of the exemption decision the "automatic," essentially mechanical

use of the emergency exemption when based on an extant "state of emergency" would appear
to be clearly contrary to the intent of CEQA as interpreted by the courts. See Wildlife Alive
v. Chickering, 18 Cal. 3d 190, 206, 553 P.2d 537, 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 377, 386 (1976). Where

any reasonable possibility exists that a project or activity may have a significant effect on the
environment, an exemption would be improper. Id. See also infra notes 265-74 and accom-

panying text (discussion of Carter v. Colon).
264.

The effect of a declared "state of emergency" for purposes of CEQA should be limited

so that the qualitative aspects of the situation leading the agency to exempt itself are evaluated,
rather than the mere use of an extant "state of emergency" proclamation.
265.

507 F. Supp. 1026 (D.P.R. 1980).

266. Id. at 1028. If a "state of emergency" were declared without satisfying the notion
of "emergency" under the Emergency Services Act, a challenge to an exemption decision by
an agency would be quite proper. This is, however, the identical question raised above pertaining to a challenge to the proclamation of emergency itself, assuredly a very difficult case to
prove. For purposes of proving either abuse of discretion by the President or Governor or

nonapplicability of the emergency proclamation to CEQA, the standard of review should be
relaxed
267.
268.
269.
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The district court stated that a presidential declaration of emergency
was in effect at the time of the exemption decision, and even though
that declaration was deserving of great deference, judicial review of
the declaration was proper in light of the circumstances. 27 The court
held that the definition of "emergency" under the Federal Disaster
Relief Act, 27' which is similar to the CEQA definition, did not support the application of the exemption to the refugee situation.2 7 Relying on the plain meaning of the statutory definition and legislative
intent, the court found that only naturaldisasters of an unusual, sudden, and unexpected nature fell within the scope of the definition. 2"
Colon is highly instructive for the reasonable, nonmechanical treatment given to the concept of "emergency" for environmental purposes, and more importantly, for analyzing the effect of a declared
"state of emergency" on environmental exemptions.274 As the
"emergency" in the Tulare Project was economic, and thus, nonnatural, the gubernatorial declaration of emergency should not have
been used to exempt the pumping project from the provisions of
CEQA. Strict construction of the CEQA declaration of emergency
exemption, therefore, is appropriate in light of the Colon rationale
and the general judicial posture toward all CEQA exemptions.
The second question posed above, regarding the duration of a "state
of emergency" for purposes of CEQA, truly raises the issue of whether
the "state of emergency" exemption has become a talisman in whose
presence CEQA fades away. In the Tulare Lake scenario, the proclamation of emergency was made no later than March 15, 1983, and
was still in effect when TLRD 749 declared itself exempt over five
months later, in August 1983.275 At this point, however, even project

proponents conceded that the physical emergency had dissipated,
evolving into a perceived economic emergency.2 76 Thus, the exercise
270. Id.
271. 42 U.S.C. §5122(1) (codifying section 102(1) of the Disaster Relief Act).
'Emergency' means any hurricane, tornado, storm, flood, high water, winddriven
water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide,
snowstorm, drought, fire, explosion, or other catastrophe in any part of the United
States which requires Federal Emergency assistance to supplement State and local
efforts to save lives and protect property. .. .

Id.
272.

Colon, 507 F. Supp. at 1032.

273.

Id.

274. Id.
275. See Proclamation of a State of Emergency, signed by Gov. George Deukmejian, March
21, 1983 (copy on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
276. See Telephone conversation with Mike Nordstrom, Attorney for Tulare Lake Storage
District (Dec. 7, 1983) (notes on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
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of this specific emergency exemption has taken on a rote, mechanical
aspect, in effect, ignoring the qualitative requirements imposed by
CEQA to justify an "emergency." Furthermore, since the natural condition of Tulare Lake land fluctuates between wet and dry conditions, a serious question arises whether the pumping project was designed to "restore" or "replace" property in accordance with the
exemption .2 Again, what is sought to be replaced here are anticipated
profits from farming lake bed land in dry years. As atfalyzed above,
no legislative intent can be found to support the inference that lost
profits fall within the emergency exemption.7
In addition to finding the emergency exemptions (other than the
declaration of emergency exemption) inapplicable to the Tulare Project because of the failure to satisfy the CEQA definitional component, this author maintains that further ground for denying the
emergency exemptions is found in the exemptions themselves. One
of these exemptions pertains to emergency repairs to public service
facilities necessary to maintain service. 2' 9 This exemption is inapplicable
to the pumping project by virtue of the lack of damage to any public
service facilities. Similarly, the other exemption for specific actions
necessary to prevent or mitigate an emergency," ' would fail. Whatever
natural emergency situation may have originally existed was no longer
in existence at the time the exemption decision was made.
Of concern here is the likelihood that every wet year, the identical
short-term "solution" with the identical long-term environmental
threats, will be employed. If an ongoing exemption for this type of
project is to be established, the requisite procedures must be followed.
Should a categorical exemption be sought, CEQA specifies the requisite procedures. 8' If a statutory exemption is sought, the legislative
forum is the appropriate body for the decision. The apparent trend
revealing an abuse of the emergency exemptions would be best
characterized as the type of bootstrapping or exemption by implication or misclassification that the California courts have cautioned
282
against so strongly.
PROPOSALS TO AMEND PERTINENT CEQA PROVISIONS

Since the authority to declare a project exempt from the requirements
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
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See CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §§21080(b)(3), 21172.
See supra notes 243-53 and accompanying text.
CAL. PuB. Ras. CODE §21080(b)(2).
Id. §21080(b)(4).
See id. §21086.
See supra notes 100-35 and accompanying text.
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of CEQA is often largely in the hands of the state or local sponsor-

ing agency alone, improved notice provisions should be required to
inform the public of agency decisions that, arguably, are contrary
to the purpose of CEQA. To the extent that filing notices of exemption is not required of public agencies, the public is unable to provide input for the benefit of decision-makers. "83 Under this system,
projects may be approved and undertaken within a very short time
period, in essence, hidden from public view. For these reasons, this
author proposes that a mandatory notice of exemption provision be
made applicable to'all public agencies. Furthermore, the EIR Monitor,
published by the Resources Agency,28 ' should return to its past format
under which exemption decisions and the specific exemption applied
were made available to concerned CEQA observers.285
This author also proposes that an agency exemption under the state
of emergency provision be evaluated in terms of the degree of
emergency necessitating the exemption. Currently, this is theoretically accomplished through proper exercise of discretion at the lead agency
level. The Tulare Lake Project Model, however, reveals that this discretion is suspect.286 Given the notion that the blanket "state of
emergency" exemption presently represents an "easy" exemption, many
agencies will apply it mechanically. A list of criteria to assist in the
determination of the degree or imminence of the emergency would
be invaluable in assessing whether the facts of a given situation, as
they currently exist, justify the use of an emergency exemption. As
a result, agency discretion will retain the role it currently occupies.
With proper criteria, both environmental and economic, the goals of
CEQA can only be furthered.
Additionally, while the State CEQA Guidelines provide for public
review of both EIRs and negative declarations," 7 no similar provi-

283. See id. §§21108, 21152. California courts have long recognized the value and importance of public input in the CEQA process. See Russian Hill Improvement Association v. Board
of Permit Appeals, 44 Cal. App. 3d 158, 167, 171, 118 Cal. Rptr. 490, 496, 498 (1974). Disclosure
of the EIR prior to the administrative decision is required by CEQA to permit input from
the public and other agencies. Id. at 166, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 495. Public participation is an
integral part of the environmental review process and creates a feedback mechanism to improve the quality of public decision making. Bendix, supra note 82, at 529.
284. The Secretary of Resources will provide for publication of a bulletin entitled "California EIR Monitor" on a subscription basis to provide public notice of amendments to the
guidelines, the completion of draft EIRs, and other matters as deemed appropriate. CAL. ADMN. CODE tit. 14, §15240.
285. The language of CEQA Guidelines section 15240 clearly allows for this proposed format. Id.
286. See supra notes 161-232 and accompanying text.
287. See CAL. Aonm.
CODE tit. 14, §§15087, 15200-15210.
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sion for review exists for exemption decisions. Undoubtedly, the impact of a poor decision at this early stage may be far more severe
than later in the process.2 8 To safeguard against agency abuse of
discretion in this regard, a provision for public review of exemption
decisions, where appropriate, should be enacted. The above notice
and exemption proposals are entirely in accord with general CEQA
policies of adequate notice and informational input involving broad
sectors of society.
The specific statutory exemptions of CEQA render the procedural
and substantive review provisions inapplicable to projects they are
intended to cover.289 In the case of emergencies, agencies should abide
by the CEQA provisions as early in the project as possible with the
proviso that if a valid emergency arises prior to the completion of
CEQA documentation, then going foreward with the project is
justifiable. 290 Thus, in the Tulare Lake Project, much, if not all, of
the CEQA documentation, including thorough analysis of alternatives,
could have been completed prior to the declared emergency. 29 '
This concept of requiring the CEQA documentation and review process to begin early in the process and continue until a valid emergency
exempts further compliance should result in some documentation being prepared within the existing framework. Thus, when confronted
by a less pressing emergency situation in which decisions may properly be made after several days or even weeks of evaluation, an abbreviated environmental document or "mini EIR" should be generated
to analyze the impact of the proposed project and reasonable alternatives to that project. 29 2 For instance, in the Tulare Lake scenario,
an environmental document along the lines of a "mini EIR" would
have discussed the factual data pertinent to analyzing the alternatives
available to the dredging and pumping operation. Alternative proposals included the following: (1) breaching existing agricultural levees
in order to reduce the danger of flooding to nearby towns; (2) moving
the floodwaters south from the Tulare Basin into the California
Aqueduct; (3) diverting the water to groundwater recharge basins to
counter conditions of overdraft; (4) allowing a significant part of the
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

See supra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
See CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§21080-21080.13, 21172.
See 1983 CEQA Hearings, supra note 146.
Id.
This "mini-EIR" should be similar in format to the CEQA EIR. See CAL. Pun. REs.
CODE §21061. Conceptually, this "mini-EIR" could resemble the type of documentation that
results from the abbreviated review procedures authorized by the statutory exemption relating
to certified state regulatory programs. See id. §21080.5.
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lake to remain established as a waterfowl habitat and for recreation;
(5) draining of a smaller portion of the lake, thereby reducing the
need for pumping to begin immediately; and (6) doing nothing, or
a "no project" alternative.2 93 This final alternative deserves special
mention due to the fact that even if the project were entirely successful, a wet year in 1983-84 effectively would have negated the project efforts, leaving the lake bed land under water for yet another
period of time.2 94 TLRD 749, in its permit application, observed that
several long-range 1983-84 weather forecasts predicted another very
wet year. Moreover, TLRD 749 noted that the project would not result
in the dewatering of Tulare Lake by the 1984 growing season if the
basin was subjected to heavy inflow during the winter or spring of

1984.295 In light of these statements implying a slight chance of project success, the exemption decision appears to have been improper.

The Environmental Assessment prepared by the Army Corps of
Engineers merely raised and discarded three alternative proposals as
unreasonable.2 9 Additional reliable information that would be prepared
under the "mini EIR" framework would have enabled the decisionmaker to evaluate all the relevant data before rendering a decision.
CONCLUSION

Through a historical and policy oriented approach to examining

CEQA and the emergency exemptions contained therein, this com293. CAL. ADMJN. CODE tit. 14, §15126(d) (alternatives to the proposed action). The specific
alternative of "no project" shall also be evaluated along with the impact. Id. §15126(d)(2).
In 1973, the National Water Commission, in a report entitled "Water Policies for the Future,"
made some eminently reasonable suggestions that pertain to the Tulare Lake Project herein
discussed. See TRELEASE, CASES AND MATERIALS, WATER LAW 694-95 (3rd Ed. 1979). The Commission, while recommending that flood plain lands should be treated as an important resource
and managed so as to make the maximum net contribution to national welfare, reminds the
Congress that the material wealth of the nation is not enhanced by the development of lands
subject to flood overflow unless the net value of the resulting production exceeds the costs
of development plus the flood losses, or the cost of preventing such losses, and that nonmaterial values sacrificed through the development must be counted as costs. Id. The Commission emphasized that fuller consideration should be given to alternative measures such as flood
plain management plans and zoning, development of other lands not subject to flooding, and
use of flood plains for open space, recreational and park purposes. Id.
Furthermore, while on the subject of consideration of alternatives, consider Governor Deukmejian's statements in his January 10, 1984 State of the State address. The Governor remarked
that efforts to increase surface and groundwater storage capacity south of the Delta will be
high on the agenda of the administration. See Sacramento Bee, Jan. 11, 1984, at A13, col. 5.
294. See Tulare Lake Reclamation District 749, Application For A Department Of The Army Permit (Sept. 9, 1983), Attachment No. 3 (copy on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
295. Id.
296. See ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 169, at 1-2. The three options rejected
by the Corps of Engineers were the following: (1) to move the water south from the Tulare
Lake Basin into the California Aqueduct; (2) to divert the water to groundwater recharge basins
in Kern County; and (3) to deny the permit, i.e., the no-project alternative. Id.
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ment has sought to determine whether the largely unchecked discretion with which agencies may use these exemptions has resulted in
unjustified circumvention of the procedural and substantive provisions
of CEQA. The Tulare Lake Project Model has been analyzed as an
example involving these CEQA provisions. The overall goals of CEQA
have been explored to elucidate the decision-maker's dilemma. The
difficult task of determining when and in what weight economic factors
are to be considered in the CEQA process has been discussed, primarily
in the context of a CEQA "emergency." While economics is a vital
force in the growth of a region and should be considered by a public
agency in appropriatesituations, the fact remains, as this comment
has shown, that economic factors are clearly subordinate to environmental considerations. Furthermore, based on the statutory construction argument above, whatever role economic criteria play in CEQA,
the consideration given these criteria in the Tulare Lake Model with
respect to emergency exemptions, was unwarranted.
The Tulare Lake Model reveals that the emergency exemptions have
been stretched beyond their intended use. The Wildlife Alive, Myers,
and City of Coronado line of cases cautioned against this very type
of abuse. By strictly enforcing the provisions of CEQA and implementing the notice and emergency exemption proposals outlined, the discretion now possessed by these agencies may be curtailed. Only then
will the likelihood of continuing circumvention of CEQA through
misuse of the emergency exemptions be reduced.
The Tulare Lake Pumping Project has largely followed the letter
of CEQA. Whether the decision to exempt the project entirely from
CEQA will result in the ecological catastrophe feared remains to be
seen. In this sense, one must seriously question whether TLRD 749
complied with the spirit of the CEQA regulatory provisions.

Howard S. Nevins
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